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THE VAGARIES OF INFORMED CONSENT
George P. Smith, ll*
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Within the phrase informed consent, both manipulative and coercive
vectors of force can be found. First, the health care provider
[M]ust gain the 'consent' of the patient to prove that she was
not physically or psychologically forced into a procedure.
We then insist that this consent be 'informed,' recognizing
that if a patient readily agrees to something about which she
understands little or about which she has a false understand-
ing, we have somehow or other abrogated or sidestepped her
autonomous decision-making rights.'
The patient-physician relationship is central to the foundations of
medical morality. From it emerge normative guidelines that effectuate ideally
the end of medicine-to render "a right and good healing action in the
interests of a particular patient."2 Technical competence, then, is shaped by
this goal and, indeed, the very acts of the medical profession are to be con-
sidered unauthentic if they neglect to fulfill the real expectation of technical
competence.3 It is upon both the patient-physician relationship and the
acknowledged technical competence built by a "participatory moral agency"
that forces disclosure of all levels of information necessary for the patient's
valid choice or genuine consent to medical treatments.4
* LL.D. 1998, Indiana University; LL.M. 1975, Columbia University; J.D. 1964,
Indiana University; B.S. 1961, Indiana University. Professor of Law, The Catholic University
of America, Washington, D.C. Parts of this article are drawn from my book, LEGAL AND
HEALTHCARE ETHICS FOR THE ELDERLY (1996).
1. WILLLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OFAUTONOMY 159 (1996).
See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient & Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and
Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47
(1994) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Autonomy]; Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Human Person, the
Physician and the Physician's Ethics, 62 LINACRE Q. 74 (1995) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Human
Person].
2. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality: The Primacn'
of the Act of Profession and the Fact of Illness, 4 J. MED. & PHIL. 32, 47 (1979) [hereinafter
Pellegrino, Reconstruction].
3. Id. at 49.
4. Id. See generally DANIEL P. SULMASY, THE HEALER' S CALLING: A SPIRITUALITY FOR
PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (1997); THOMAS SzASZ, THE THEOLOGY
OF MEDICINE ch. 1 (1977).
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While the desire for obtaining information may be seen as stronger than
the one for actually making the determinative health care decision itself, not
every patient welcomes such information.' Indeed, realizing that most indivi-
duals make decisions rather badly forces many to choose to delegate medical
decision-making to others.6 For those declining to make their own decisions,
it is quite simply psychologically attractive to pass responsibility for hard
choices to others.7 When this delegation occurs, it might be wise to consider
developing a "full social impact calculus" which in turn considers all the
people affected by it'-immediate family members, close friends, social
workers as well as spiritual and health care providers. This calculus could be
taken when the initial decision for obtaining treatments or accessing them are
made. A full social impact calculus would result in some cases even arising
where the sum of the social, economic, and medical consequences "on others
may outweigh the impact on the person most affected."9
Patient information deficits must be remedied by the physician to the
fullest extent possible.'° The information disclosed must be complete, clear,
and understandable in the patient's own language so that the patient knows not
only the nature of his or her illness, its prognosis, and the alternative modes
of treatment, together with their cost and probable effectiveness, but also the
degrees of discomfort and the ultimate side effects on the quality of life. This
duty of disclosure cannot be exercised by the physician on the grounds of
patient ignorance or harm. To do so would underscore the inequality in
information between patient and doctor and obstruct the goal of a morally
valid consent that in turn is the memorialization of the patient's individual
moral agency."1
The physician must always guard against manipulating patient choice
and consent in order to simply accommodate his own personal or social
philosophy. Setting valid limits on the degree to which manipulated consent
is morally permissible is difficult. Two major situations are commonly
recognized in which a physician can, and indeed should, exert moral agency
for the patient and make the value choice on his behalf. The most common
5. CARLE. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OFAUTONOMY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS & MEDICAL
DECISIONS 110 (1998). See TERRANCE MCCONNELL, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF
CONSENT IN MEDICINE AND THE LAW 77, 78 (2000) (maintaining the position that physicians
are not obligated to comply with such patient wishes because such a waiver is valid only if it
is both voluntary and informed).
6. SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 99. See also MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS 208 (6th ed. 2003).
7. SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 175.
8. Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J.
727, 737 (1993).
9. Id. See generally ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OFTHELAW IN BIOETHICAL
DECISION MAKING ch. 7 (1996).
10. Pellegrino, Reconstruction, supra note 2, at 50. But see VEATCH, infra note 47
(discussing the therapeutic privilege to withhold information).
11. Pellegrino, Reconstruction, supra note 2, at 50.
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case is where the patient and/or family request the physician to act according
to their wishes-because of their emotional unwillingness or intellectual
inability to deal with the immediate situation. In cases of this nature, it would
be a failure of the authenticity of his act of profession for the physician not to
assume moral agency and decide what course of action should be taken.
When dealing with surrogate decision makers, it is even more important for
the physician to ascertain with certainty that the surrogate is being guided by
the best interests of the patient.12
The second situation in which a physician should exert moral agency for
the patient occurs in emergency cases, in an intensive care or coronary care
unit, or in an operating or emergency room. Because of the urgency of the
situation, it is impossible for the physician to consult the patient; therefore, he
must consult the patient's immediate family or a designated surrogate decision
maker. In both of these situations, the physician's Golden Rule should be to
act in such a manner as to "accord the patient the same opportunity to express
or actualize his own view of what he considers worthwhile," as would be
desired by the physician himself.13 This rule, then, reinforces the mandate not
only to bring compassion to the patient's illness, but exhibit the mandate as
a "conscious advertence" in the act of profession and the act of medicine as
well.
14
The other party to informed decision-making is obviously the patient.
Thus, the ethics of the good patient require truthfulness in the information
given to the physician; avoidance of manipulation; faithful following of
mutually agreed upon recommendations; self-education for comprehension of
the facts disclosed by the physician; promise not to consult another physician
(absent suspicion of either dishonesty or malpractice); and acknowledgment
of a partial obligation to participate in reasonable therapeutic experiments
designed to promote a healing of the patient's disease or those directed toward
the discovery of possible cures for his or her own disease for others (non
therapeutic), provided the other rules for professional behavior are followed.15
12. Id. at 51.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 52,54-55. See Len Doyal, The Moral Importance of Informed Consent in Medi-
cal Research: Concluding Reflections, in INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL RESEARCH 313 (Len
Doyal & Jeffrey S. Tobias eds., 2001) (arguing that certain types of medical research- epide-
miological, for example-should be exempted from the informed consent requirement and,
further, that in certain other cases where the research subject is incompetent, as with children
having the consent of their parents, or in trauma cases where there is an acceptable risk-benefit
ratio). See DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT PRICE BETTER HEALTH?: HAZARDS OF THE RESEARCH
IMPERATIVE (2003) (arguing the therapeutic/non-therapeutic distinction gives rise to "therapeu-
tic misconception" which arises when "a clinician researcher carries out research of no expected
or intended benefit to a patient but which the patient believes will offer a chance of benefit").
See also Guido Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentations in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS
387, 401 (1964) (advocating some form of consent should always be required which seeks to
strike a balance between present and future lives). See generally Jonathan Montgomery, Inform-
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What is seen in totality, then, between the patient and the physician is a set of
mutually binding obligations that, if met, assure informed decision-making in
health care services.1
6
The ongoing debate regarding the efficacy and integrity of the doctrine
of informed consent and its application has been termed "oblique and
inconclusive,"' 7 and indeed a little more than a "fairy tale."' 8 The reason for
this state of affairs is attributed to a structural weakness reflecting not only a
rapacious health care delivery system that is increasingly cost-conscious,' 9
complex, and sophisticated,2" but also by constraints imposed by the tort law
system, human psychology, and the physician-patient relationship,2' all of
which are largely intractable.22 Coupled with these foundational issues is the
recognition that the adequate levels of both empirical research and analysis,
together with comparative risk evaluation necessary to resolve the uncertain-
ties, is not being pursued.23
Yet, for all of the weaknesses, the doctrine of informed consent and its
offspring in elder care, negotiated consent,24 serves a significant purpose in
contemporary society-both as a construct and often a template for establish-
ing an interdependent relationship, if not therapeutic partnership, between the
patient and his or her physician where truth-telling becomes the crux of the
doctrine and a true moral relationship between both parties is recognized.25
The purpose of this Article, then, is to probe the foundations and
applications of informed consent in a variety of situations and thereby test its
validity. The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that while the
doctrine has yet to become an integral part of the ethos of medicine,2 6 it still
provides an important mechanism for maintaining a purposeful discourse
ed Consent in Clinical Research with Children, in INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL RESEARCH,
supra note 15, at 173.
16. See Arthur L. Caplan, Informed Consent and Provider-Patient Relationships in
Rehabilitation, 69 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 312 (1988); Dan W. Brock,
The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Patients, I KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 28 (1991).
17. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 904-05 (1994).
18. Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 69 (1993).
19. See generally TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC
HEALTHCARE PROGRAMS AND RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE (2003); ELEANOR D. KINNEY,
PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS (2002); George P. Smith, II, Distributive
Justice and Health Care, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 421 (2002).
20. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 5.
21. Pellegrino, Autonomy, supra note 1; Pellegrino, Human Person, supra note 1;
SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 205; Schuck, supra note 17, at 905.
22. Schuck, supra note 17, at 905.
23. Id.
24. See generally Harry R. Moody, From Informed Consent to Negotiated Consent, 28
GERONTOLOGIST 64 (Supp. 1988).
25. GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 1, at 55.
26. Katz, supra note 18, at 91.
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between physician and patient and, as such, nurturing and preserving their
essential partnership of healing and trust.
2
I. MALPRACTICE AND INFORMED CONSENT
A. Professional or Lay Standards
A claim for malpractice is recognized essentially when a patient, as a
direct result of a physician's failure to render that level of care consistent with
what would have been given by other practicing physicians in the community
in question, is injured.28 Thus, the standard of conduct against which the
defending physician's behavior is measured is tied to the conduct other
similarly situated professionals in the field would have followed under the
same or similar circumstances. The end result of this evaluation process is
that the objective standard of reasonableness is thereby excluded totally from
the evaluation. 9
As to the elements of establishing a cause of action for failure to obtain
informed consent for either a medical treatment or procedure, there is less
uniformity of view.3" Indeed, under older case law, the duty to obtain
informed consent for a medical intervention was inherent in the essential idea
that nonconsensual touching was, and is, a legal battery. Modem case law,
however, now takes one of two approaches to the duty to obtain informed
32 33consent, yet treats the central issue as one of negligence.
27. See generally Pellegrino, Autonomy, supra note 1; Pellegrino, Human Person, supra
note 1; Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2
J. CONTEmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23 (1986) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Gatekeeping]. See also
Mark A. HalL Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STVN. L. REv. 463, 478 (2002) (maintaining that
without a minimal level of trust, patients will neither disclose information to the physician nor
follow medical recommendations made to him or her).
28. Laura Hunter Dietz, Annotation, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers. 61 A1.
JUR. 2D Physicians § 202 (1981). See also HALL ET AL.. supra note 6, at 201, 203, 210.
29. Dietz, supra note 28.
30. Id. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law
of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL L. REv. 607 (1988).
31. Dietz, supra note 28, §§ 150-52. See FOWLER V. HARPER ETAL, LAW OFTORTS § 3.2
(2d ed. 1986).
32. Hunter L. Prillaman, A Physician's Duty to Inform of Newly Developed Therapy, 6
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 43, 44 (1990).
33. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 729. Since the 1957 decision in Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. University Board ofTrustees, the courts have been emphasizing and developing a negligence
offailure to use due care theory of liability. 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). This
theory in turn places the physician in default for failing to educate adequately his patient to the
collateral risks involved in the treatment. Indeed, Salgo provided the groundwork for the
explosion of cases dealing with informed consent. In Salgo, as now, the physician is confronted
with a perplexing problem: namely, how to balance the patient's need to know the risks and
alternatives to treatment in order to give an informed consent with the individual patient's
mental and emotional condition to accept and understand the medical information. Id. See also
2004]
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Some states require a professional standard to be followed that in turn
imposes a duty upon all physicians to inform their patients of not only the
risks, but also the alternatives to any proposed medical treatment in the same
manner as other physicians would practicing in the community.34 Accord-
ingly, in a 1981 Illinois case,35 the court held that applying the reasonable
medical practitioner standard of informed consent meant that there must
indeed be specific expert medical testimony "of the necessity to inform
patients of possible alternatives."36 Consequently, adherence to that level of
care given in the relevant community by other practitioners applies both to
malpractice actions and the separate action of failure to obtain informed
consent.37
Other states choose to apply the lay or prudent patient standard of
informed consent, thereby requiring a physician to inform his patient of all
sources and degrees of information which an average, ordinary, and reason-
able patient should and would require in order to make an informed decision
regarding the need to submit to a proposed treatment therapy.38 Under this
standard of informed consent:
[A] physician is liable to his or her patient if (1) the physician
fails to disclose any risk in the recommended treatment, or
the existence of any alternative method of treatment, that a
reasonable person would deem material in deciding whether
to undergo the recommended treatment; (2) the patient would
have foregone the recommended treatment had he or she
known of the undisclosed information; and (3) as a result of
David Thomasma & Edmund D. Pellegrino, Medicine, Science, Self-Interest: Value Sets in
Conflict in Human Experimentation, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: ETHICS, LAW AND
SOCIALPOLICY xviipassim (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998). Therefore, under Salgo, a physician
owes a duty to his patient to disclose facts necessary to the formation of an intelligent consent
and, further, subjects himself to liability for violation of that duty. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181. At
best confusing, the Salgo rule allows plaintiff's counsel to argue that there must be full
disclosure because of the established duty to disclose. However, a court may use Salgo as
justification for holding in favor of a defendant on the issue of the adequacy of
disclosure-sustaining the proposition that the amount of information the physician gave the
patient was sufficient for him to understand the risks and alternatives of the proposed treatment.
Myers, infra note 44, at 1399. The discretion allowed to physicians has tended to subject them
to liability in cases involving high risk and to exonerate them when a court considers the risk
to be light. Id.
34. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher (Hondroulis 11), 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
35. Ziegert v. S. Chi. Cmty. Hosp., 425 N.E.2d 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
36. Prillaman, supra note 32, at 45.
37. Id.
38. Id. See generally INST. OFMED., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (Daniel D. Federman et al. eds., 2003); KENNETH
GETZ & DEBORAH BORFITZ, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE TO THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF
VOLUNTEERING FOR CLINICAL TRIALS (2002); 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 50.1
(2004).
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the recommended treatment, the patient actually suffers an
injury the risk of which was undisclosed, or the patient
actually suffers an injury that would not have occurred had
the patient opted for one of the undisclosed methods of treat-
ment.39
11. THE FOUNDATIONAL PARADIGM
The 1972 case of Canterbury v. Spence4" presents a modem, comprehen-
sive, and focal paradigm of the legal concept of informed consent in applica-
tion. In Canterbury, a young boy complaining of back pain submitted to a
myelogram which revealed a filling defect. The boy's mother was contacted
after the test and an operation was recommended by Dr. William T. Spence,
the attending physician, stating that such an operation was "not anymore
[serious] than any other operation."'" The boy submitted to the operation
without being informed that paralysis was a risk of the procedure. Mrs.
Canterbury arrived at the hospital after the operation and signed a consent
form. The boy fell from his bed a day after the operation while, without
assistance, he attempted to void. He thereupon became paralyzed and was
required to undergo a second surgery. This time, Mrs. Canterbury signed a
consent form before the operation. Years later, the youth "hobbled about on
crutches, a victim of paralysis of the bowels and urinary incontinence."42 At
trial, Dr. Spence testified that there was only a one percent risk of paralysis
occurring after this type of surgery. The central issue of the case was the
scope and application of the doctrine of informed consent.
Because there is a duty to disclose risks of a procedure, the scope of that
duty should be known. Any standard set in terms of what is done in the
medical profession will be at odds with the patient's prerogative to decide on
prospective therapy. This "right of self-decision shapes the boundary of the
duty to reveal."43 In order that the patient's interest in achieving his own
determination of treatment is fulfilled, it is the law which must set the
standard for adequate disclosure.44 The test enunciated in Canterbury is that
a "risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows
39. Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 103, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). See also Festa v. Greenberg,
511 A.2d 1371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989 (Pa. D. 1981).
40. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Accord Wilkinson v. Vesey,
295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972). See also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Natanson v. Kline,
350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), clarified by 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
41. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 777.
42. Id. at 776.
43. Id. at 786.
44. See Michael Justin Myers, Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55
CAL. L. REv. 1396, 1407-10 (1967).
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or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach signifi-
cance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the
proposed therapy."45 This includes a discussion of the inherent and potential
dangers of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, and the
likely results if the patient remains untreated.
The courts have noted two exceptions to the general rule of disclosure.
The first is where the person is unconscious or otherwise incapable of con-
senting and there is imminent harm that would result from failure to treat,
which in turn outweighs any harm threatened by the proposed treatment.46 If
possible, consent of relatives should then be obtained. The second exception
arises when the disclosure itself threatens the patient and thus becomes
infeasible from a medical point of view. The critical inquiry, then, would be
whether the physician was guided by sound medical judgment.47 This privi-
lege does not carry with it the paternalistic notion that the physician may
remain silent simply because diligence might prompt the patient to forego the
physician's recommended therapy.48
The danger of this second exception is that it may be judged by a
subjective, hindsight test. Canterbury speaks to this concern and resolves it
by requiring a determination of whether a prudent person in the patient's
position would have decided to undergo treatment "if suitably informed of all
perils bearing significance. '49 This affords opportunity for medical testimony
regarding the relevance of certain risks, as well as other testimony by anyone
45. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
46. See Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1970).
47. See Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962). See also THOMAS
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS ch. 3 (1979). A
therapeutic privilege exists to withhold information from a patient if it is either considered
potentially harmful or it would cause any counter-therapeutic deterioration-no matter how
slight-in either the patient's physical, psychological, or emotional well being. ROBERT M.
VEATCH, MEDICAL ETHICS 203-04 (2d ed. 1997). The "urgency of the situation" justifies this
exception to the doctrine of informed consent. JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN
BEINGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSION AND STATE IN THE
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS 37, 84 (1972). See also Kathleen M. Boozang, The
Therapeutic Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687, 746 (2002)
(arguing, for example, that if viewed as effective treatment, with a therapeutic effect being
achieved by its prescription and use, the representation that placebo use is therapy or medicine
is neither untrue nor unethical); HALL ET AL., supra note 6, at 207; George J. Annas, Questing
for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 297, 300, 314 (1996) (asserting that the very concept of
therapeutic research should be eliminated altogether since it confuses the ideology of medicine
with the ideology of science).
48. Myers, supra note 44, at 1409-10. See generally Allan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to
the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical
Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413.
49. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791.
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having sufficient knowledge and capacity to testify. The courts thus assume
a determinative role in assessing liability."
In the pre-Canterbury period, courts sought to enforce a narrower
objective test for materiality (reasonable doctor) and a broad-based test for
causation (subjective patient). With Canterbury, a broad test for materiality
is advanced (reasonable patient) and a narrower objective test for causation
(what a reasonable patient would have chosen) preferred.5 Criticism has been
maintained that with Canterbury the courts are incorrectly treating informed
consent as yet another branch of negligent medical practice instead of
recognizing the patient's interest in autonomy and his or her right to make an
informed choice about medical care. This right is the key interest protected
by the informed consent doctrine. However, these criticisms are muted when
hard questions are raised regarding how to value the protected interest and
determine damages for interference thereto.52
A. Alternative Treatment
Utilizing either the professional standard or the lay standard of informed
consent, a physician is under a duty not only to inform his patient of
appropriate alternative treatments, in addition to the alternative of no
treatment at all, but also to describe and evaluate the benefits and the risks of
those treatments to his at-risk patient. 3 Not every "conceivable alternative to
every detail of treatment" need be provided, however. 4 Setting the limits of
a physician's duty to inform patients of alternative treatments continues to be
a struggle for the courts. If a professional standard of informed consent is
adhered to, much difficulty in application is alleviated, since ajury panel will
seek to decide the issue in conflict by comparing the testimony of competing
medical experts.55 If, however, the lay standard is followed, the jury
determination is more complex because an evaluation must be made of what
an ordinary, reasonable patient would both want and need to know under
similar circumstances.56
50. Landmark examples of the way in which courts have treated the application of
informed consent include: Corn v. French, 331 P.2d 850 (Nev. 1958) (physician held liable
where mastectomy was performed with a signed consent form, but patient had told physician
that she did not want anything removed); DiRosse v. Wein, 24 A.D.2d 510 (N.Y. 1965) (failure
to tell of the danger of exfoliative dermatitis from gold treatment for rheumatoid arthritis,
resulting in exfoliative dermatitis, imposed liability on the physician); and Darrah v. Kite, 32
A.D.2d 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (failure to give adequate and timely explanation of the risks
of ventricolograms, imposed liability on a neurologist).
51. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 615 n.30.
52. Id. at 620 n.47.
53. Prillaman, supra note 32, at 47.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 48.
56. Id.
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Obviously, a decision reached according to this standard requires
considerable and complex analysis of the credibility of opinions of opposing
experts on varying community standards. Of additional complexity is the
court's need to comprehensively instruct a jury on the elements of a medically
acceptable alternative before the jury can be allowed to decide whether the
average reasonable patient would indeed have wanted to know of the
alternative.57
Medical acceptability is the criterion by which a fact finder determines
whether an alternative treatment is to be disclosed.5" The obvious difficulty
here is fully comprehending those components or elements of a particular
treatment, especially a new one, that make it acceptable and determine to
whom it must be found acceptable.59 "In terms of a doctor's duty to disclose,
this issue can be broken down into two parts. First, what criteria, objective or
subjective, make a particular treatment acceptable? Second, are there
additional factors which create (or excuse) the particular physician's duty to
know about the treatment?"6° Every new medical treatment, whether it be
surgery, drug therapy or an exotic technique, is initially experimental.6
In those cases where a lay approach to informed consent is followed, it
must be first recognized that it cannot be extended effectively to determine
what specific alternative treatments are medically acceptable, although it may
well indeed be used as a mechanism through which acceptable treatments are
revealed.62 The juries applying the lay standard or approach to determine
what a reasonable patient would have considered medically valid and
acceptable leads to an interesting quandary for the concerned physician: the
physician would never be in a position to know precisely which alternatives
he or she must describe. This in turn could drive the physician to describe
even quack treatments for fear that a future jury could find that a reasonable
patient might have wished to be informed of such treatments.63
A wiser approach acknowledges the standard for medical acceptability
is based solely on the perception of the reasonable practitioner. 64 Here, the
pivotal inquiry would not necessarily be whether a reasonable practitioner
would inform a patient of the particular alternative. Rather, the question to be
raised would be simply whether an average, reasonable practitioner would
57. Id.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Prillaman, supra note 32, at 52.
60. Id.
61. Id. In a landmark 1990 case in California, it was determined that an individual patient
must first give an informed consent to a surgical procedure that would in turn yield tissues
which would be transformed, subsequently, through genetic engineering, into commercial
products of considerable value. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 749 (Cal.
1990).
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believe the treatment was a viable, medically acceptable alternative; or stated
otherwise, whether it was recognized as an appropriate modality of treatment
by a significant number of acknowledged experts in the field.65 The role of
expert testimony then would essentially be to explore both the number and the
respectability of those accepting the treatment.66 Developing and following
this standard would allow a physician to:
[A]void the danger of having to describe the theories of
quacks or to explain treatments too new to have a track
record, but could still be held to have a duty to keep up with
the relevant literature and other sources of information, and
to inform patients of new treatments as they met the criteria
of acceptance.67
B. Future Treatment
It is often maintained that if a particular medical treatment were to be
classified as futile, an attending physician is under no obligation to provide it
to his or her patient. Indeed, the assertion goes even further: namely, that the
physician needs not even advise a patient of the existence of such treatment.68
Judging the futility of any treatment is, arguably and correctly, a medical
matter.69 No input from the patient is thus required.7 ° Since a futile treatment
offers no benefit to the patient, it can be argued that a physician has neither
obligation to render treatment of a non-beneficent nature nor-for that
matter-does a patient have a right to demand it.7
Without knowledge of a medical or surgical alternative and without
having access to information regarding the pros and cons of each, a patient
obviously has few if any tools with which to form a therapeutic alliance with
a physician or even enter into a meaningful treatment dialogue with that
physician.72 While the physician avoids conflicts with his or her patient, this
veil of silence often robs the patient of the right to self-determination, all
under the guise of medical paternalism.73 Whenever a treatment is labeled
futile, it is exempted from the requirement of discussion. Thus the label itself
"becomes a very powerful tool for relieving physicians of the requirement to
65. Id.
66. Id. at 58.
67. Id.





72. Id. at 198. See generally JOSEPH M. JACOB, DOCTORS AND RuLES (1988).
73. See generally ALLEN E. BuCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING (1989).
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talk with their patient. The label marks off a realm in which it is argued that
the requirement does not apply. 74
C. Uninsurable Treatment Options
The results of an interesting and disturbing 1988 survey, supported by
the American Medical Association's Institute for Ethics and drawn from a
random sample of 1,124 licensed United States physicians, were published
recently.75 Sixty-four percent responded (720 physicians).76 Respondent
physicians empirically validated the belief that physicians are uneasy in
describing medically indicated care not covered by insurance.77
Because of restrictions in various health plans, useful patient care was
sometimes not offered by thirty-one percent of the reporting physicians in the
survey.78 Within this group thirty-five percent reported, additionally, that this
course of action is more common today than it was five years ago.79 On the
other hand, sixty-nine percent of the physician-respondents stated that they
rarely or never followed this practice.8"
One ethical rationale for not offering useful services not covered by
insurance is physician discomfort over requests by patients to game the
system, or, in other words, manipulate and deceive third party payers in their
health plans.8" Inasmuch as the vast majority of physicians believe such
patient requests are unethical, some might avoid such tense encounters by
electing not to offer useful but uncovered services.82
Other reasons proffered for refusing health care information include,
rather paternistically, the compassionate desire not to raise levels of expecta-
tion, especially for Medicaid or other economically impoverished patients who
have medical coverage restrictions. In other words, "why offer a useful
medical service to someone who cannot afford it?
83
Financial pressures on physicians are also seen as a significant
determinant in decisions to withhold treatment information. For physicians
74. Wolf, supra note 68, at 199. See generally George P. Smith, II, Utility and the
Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (1996).
75. Matthew K. Wynia et al., Do Physicians Not Offer Useful Services Because of
Coverage Restrictions, 22 HEALTH AFF. 190, 191 (2003).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 194.
78. Id. at 193.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Wynia et al., supra note 75, at 194.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 194-95. See also HALL ET AL., supra note 6, at 191.
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with "more than 25 percent of income at risk" for patient care costs, the trend
is to neglect to offer patients optimal but uncovered services."
Sadly, the results of this study parallel-and, indeed, revive-earlier
institutional concerns over gag clauses in managed care programs. In the late
1990s, these provisions were thought of as prohibiting physicians, by contract,
from discussing with their patients medical service options which were not
covered in their health plans.85
Adding significantly to present patient mistrust of the medical
profession, this 1998 survey confirms the fact that gagging continues, not by
contract, necessarily, but for other reasons as noted, all of which have the
ultimate effect of compromising the very doctrine of informed consent.86 The
pivotal ethical concern, then, is: "to what degree is it possible, and a
professional obligation, for physicians to try to explain to their patients why
some useful services are not covered?" 7
H1. INFORMED DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATED CONSENT
Although it is seen that the foundation of informed consent is now well
embedded in both the legal and medical arenas, negotiated consent is far from
being as widely accepted. In fact, the ideal of negotiated consent is only
beginning to emerge as a viable alternative to the traditional informed consent
standard, particularly with application to healthcare for the elderly.
The informed consent standard, which is based upon autonomy, emerged
from the acute care environment and from a narrowly conceived view of the
relationship between professional caregivers (physicians) and those dependent
upon them (patients).8 Similarly, the concept of negotiated consent
recognizes the ideal of autonomy, yet in a more limited fashion.89 Negotiated
consent recognizes the need for some version of "autonomy respecting
paternalism" in the environment of long-term care, particularly involving
elderly patients.9" Fundamentally, paternalistic interventions that serve to
84. Wynia et al., supra note 75, at 194-95.
85. Id. at 196.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Moody, supra note 24, at 64. See Brian F. Hofland, Autonomy in Long Term Care:
Background Issues and a Programmatic Response, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 3,4 (1988) (observing
that "patient... autonomy is not a value indigenous to medical contexts, but one imported into
medicine from extrinsic social agendas such as that of constitutional law and the evolution of
individual rights"). See also Dworkin, supra note 8, at 737 (challenging the view that autonomy
should be the dominant value in medical law and ethics).
89. Moody, supra note 24, at 64.
90. Id. (quoting DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL
BOUNDS ON BENEVOLENCE (1986)). See generally VANDEVEER supra.
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enhance autonomy and allow patients to decide and act in keeping with their
own values compose the underpinnings of negotiated consent. 91
A. Working Principles
In light of the unique issues and moral dilemmas involved in long-term
care for the elderly, the interactions between patients and practitioners are
primarily acute transactions. 92 As such, enhancing the autonomy among
patients of long-term care facilities is an extraordinarily difficult task.93 The
conditions at hand are very different from those encountered outside of
residential care facilities, where informed consent is the prevalent model. 94
Recognizing these differences, negotiated consent attempts to address the
various concerns involved and balance the involved parties' competing
interests.9" Under the negotiated consent standard, many legitimate views
must be considered involving the patient, family, and institution. 96 The results
are shared or dispersed authority for decision-making in which no single party
has the exclusive power of decision 97 and a nonalgorithmic process whereby
negotiation is not governed by strict deductive rules.98 Instead, negotiation is
"more heuristic in its cognitive style, implying less reliance on codes of ethics
and more attention to opportunities for discussion .... 99 Even in those
instances in which the ideal outcome is not attainable, a common situation
among the frail elderly, negotiation serves to make the best of a bad
situation."' °
In order to implement effectively negotiated consent, there must be
active participation by the patient or the patient's surrogate and consultation
with all parties holding an interest in the decision.0 ' Furthermore, the patient
must have at least a cursory knowledge of legal and ethical rights and the
91. Moody, supra note 24, at 64.
92. Id.
93. See Harry R. Moody, Ethical Dilemmas of Nursing Home Placement, 11 GENERA-
TIONS 16-23 (1987). The difficulties are heightened by professional interventions that verge on
being more social than medical (e.g., eating, bathing, exercise), the patients' need for a degree
of regimentation in their lifestyles, and the continuous fluctuation in competency or decisional
capacity of the patients. See also Moody, supra note 24, at 64-65.
94. Moody, supra note 24, at 65.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 67.
97. Id. Instead, negotiated consent proposes the structure of a team decision-making pro-
cess, allowing for greater influence and more effective communication. Id.
98. Id.
99. Moody, supra note 24, at 67.
100. Id.
101. Id. The notion exists, particularly with elderly patients, that a patient ought to be
aware that negotiations are underway. Furthermore, the patient should know which parties are
active participants in the negotiation process, and, ultimately, any decision derived should be
presented in such a manner as to be publicly defensible on a wide-scale basis. Id. at 68.
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"opportunity for scrutiny and enforcement of those rights through some
outside, higher authority .... 1 02 In addition, the element of power in the
deliberative process plays an integral part of the negotiated consent formula."'
Obviously, little chance for negotiation exists if one party has such superior
power as to leave the other party with no chance for deliberation. 104 By the
same token, negotiated consent does not insist on absolute equality between
the parties, either.10 5 Instead, the doctrine essentially supports the concept of
"shared decision-making" between the physician and patient in those
situations in which it is possible.0 6
Although the ideals of virtue and compassion called for in negotiated
consent may be sophistic, they are by no means quixotic. The introduction of
negotiated consent in health care for the elderly is designed primarily to urge
a different set of ideals and emphasize that practitioners must demonstrate
virtues alongside the purported rights a patient is assumed to possess.1
0 7
B. New Directions
In American society, individuals who reach the age of majority are
permitted a broad range of choice.10 8 They may choose their jobs, their
relationships, and the patterns by which they live.109 These rights of choice,
however, are often denied to elderly persons because they are unable to
effectuate preference without assistance.11
On November 1, 2002, the United States Census Bureau estimated one
in every eight Americans (roughly, 12.3% of the total population) was sixty-
five years of age and over-drawn as such from a total figure of 34.9 million
in this age group. "1 The American Hospital Association has determined that
a 7.9% increase in hospitalization occurs whenever there is a 10% increase in
102. Id. at 67.
103. Id.
104. Moody, supra note 24, at 68.
105. Id. Although the physician's base of experience endows physicians with greater facili-
ties to reason more accurately about medical issues than can their patients, the patient has the
option of non-compliance and thereby retains an element of power for himself. Id. See also
SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 110.
106. See Moody, supra note 24, at 68 (citing UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982)).
107. Moody, supra note 24, at 69.
108. Nancy N. Dubler, The Dependent Elderly: Legal Rights and Responsibilities in Agent
Custody, in ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OFGERIATRIC CARE 137 (Stuart F. Spicker et al. eds., 1987).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Resident Population Estimates of the United States by Age and
Sex. April 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999, with Short-Term Projections to November 1, 2000, available
at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile2-1 .txt (last visited Feb. 1,2004).
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the number of seniors.112 Thus, it is predicted that a majority of hospital
services, 51% of inpatient admissions and 59% of beds, will be given over to
the elderly by 2027."' By 2030, it is predicted this very group will top
seventy million people, meaning about one out of every five Americans will
be included."1 4
As the population of aging citizens grows, so does the need for such
citizens to make pivotal decisions regarding their medical treatment.
1 15
Reality dictates that the capacity of elderly patients to make such decisions is
often impaired by a higher incidence and prevalence of chronic brain
disease,116 coupled with the burden of coping with numerous other medical
afflictions. Moreover, the risk for elderly patients may be compounded
because they are more likely to be excluded from the medical decision-making
process as a result of reduced physician contact, ageism, and paternalism. 17
Even for the elderly patient, informed consent for medical decision-
making has been the standard consent practice in the medical community for
a number of years. 1 8 However, for the elderly, this process has failed in a
number of areas, one of which is the issue of a patient's competence to
consent to treatment.'19 Thus, with the doctrine of negotiated consent as an
alternative to the traditional model of informed consent, the needs and desires
of elderly patients ideally have a greater chance of being addressed adequately
and equitably.
Dependent elderly persons pose a special problem for healthcare
professionals in that their decisions often require the involvement of helpers
and facilitators.120 Such involvement may result in differing standards of
judgment and measures of worth being applied to an elder's individual
choice.' The results are conflicting value systems that often reflect the
competing concerns of institutional and individual self-protection and
112. Laura B. Benko, Boomer Bust?, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 28, 2003, at 24.
113. Id. See also L.J. Fitten & M.S. Waite, Impact of Medical Hospitalization on Treat-
ment Decision-Making in the Elderly, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNALMED. 1717 (1990). See gener-
ally James Lubitzet al., Health, Life Expectancy, and Health Care Spending Among the Elderly,
349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1048 (2003).
114. Betty Booker, Nursing-Home Costs Soar; Local Prices Average $64,000 Annually,
RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 2003, at Al.
115. Fitten & Waite, supra note 113, at 1717.
116. See id. See also Emre Kokmen et al., Epidemiologic Patterns and Clinical Features
of Dementia in a Defined U.S. Population, 105 TRANSACTIONS. AM. NEUROLOGICAL ASS'N.
334-36 (1980); W.A. Rocco et al., The Epidemiology of Dementia, 19 ANN. NEUROLOGY 415,
415-24 (1986).
117. Fitten & Waite, supra note 113, at 1717.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Dubler, supra note 108, at 137. See generally L.J. Fitten et al., Assessing Treatment
Decision-Making Capacity in Elderly Nursing Home Residents, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y
1097 (1990).
121. Dubler, supra note 108, at 137.
[Vol. 1: 109
VAGARIES OF INFORMED CONSENT
convenience. 12 In the end, the elderly person is at a great risk of losing the
right to decide the course and conduct of his or her life.
123
In such a scenario, the model of negotiated consent provides a realistic
and viable means by which the interests of all parties involved may be
represented. Negotiated consent allows for the interaction of all affected
parties, including the patient, family, clergy, and physicians. 124 This process
assures the presentation of a multitude of differing views while, ideally,
preserving the values of the patient.
The process of negotiated consent also combats another weakness of the
traditional informed consent doctrine. Commonly, informed consent can
provoke anxiety and evoke previous experiences, fantasies, and associations
for a patient, triggering an occasional primitive defense response.1 25 With
negotiated consent, the interaction of the parties and the commitment to shared
dialogue should reduce the likelihood of such a response, if not completely
eliminate it.
A further deficiency of the informed consent model, as applied to older
patients, is their inability to comprehend the specific elements of informed
consent information. 2' Thus, as a group, geriatric patients may have some
impairment in providing their informed consent with regard to medical
procedures. 2 7 Because the process of negotiated consent involves, among
other things, the friends and family of the patient, it is likely that a greater
sense of trust exists among the parties, particularly if the patient needs
assistance to comprehend fully the intricacies of the specific consent.
However, the doctrine of negotiated consent is certainly not without its
shortcomings. First of all, self-determination for long-term care residents is
a valid ideal; however, it requires opportunity, capacity, and motivation on
their part. 28 Although the opportunity and capacity factors receive a majority
of the attention within the medical community, the motivational factor must
be addressed seriously, particularly with elderly persons.'29 If elderly patients
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Moody, supra note 24, at 67. See also Dworkin, supra note 8, at 737 (arguing for a
"full social impact calculus" in the decision-making process).
125. J.P. Hess et al., Some Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Determination
of Incompetence in the Elderly, 7 MED. L. 151, 153 (1988).
126. B. Stanley et al., The Elderly Patient and Informed Consent, 252 JAMA 1302, 1305
(1984).
127. Id. The study revealed that, in comparison to their younger counterparts, older
patients did show poorer comprehension, yet, generally seemed to make equally reasonable
decisions. Id. Thus, significant adverse effects were not noted until the ability to comprehend
was considered severely impaired, as in the case of severe senile dementia. Id.
128. Moody, supra note 24, at 69.
129. Id. Moody points out that, especially with elder patients, it is possible to provide
opportunities and to safeguard rights, but without motivation, patients will derive no benefits
from these acts. Id. It is essentially a patient's own liberty that he or she must exercise in order
to take advantage of the opportunities that are available. Id.
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are not sufficiently motivated to exercise the rights being secured for them, the
doctrine of negotiated consent serves no additional benefit for the patients.
Moreover, entertaining the multitude of opinions necessary for negotiated
consent may require an overly burdensome and time-consuming recording
process, and could even result in an invitation to litigation should the parties
to the negotiation decide later that they are dissatisfied with the outcome.130
Although perhaps a valid criticism, recording the outcome of the negotiation
is obligatory for the process of negotiated consent to remain valid. 3'
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps it is a correct assessment that no meaningful collaboration or
hoped-for therapeutic alliance can be achieved between doctor and patient
until physicians treat patients as adults and not children; learn that there is a
real distinction between the physician's ideas of best treatment and those
which are seen as best by their patients; and, furthermore, learn how to
acknowledge their own ignorance in diagnosis, as well as treatment and prog-
nosis. Acting in such a manner will allow the patients to better understand the
inherent uncertainties in both the art and science of medicine which, in turn,
give rise to valid differences of belief based upon clinical experience."3
Sadly, all too often, the quest for diagnosis and cure, or what has been termed
"The Riddle," seduces many physicians and forces them to ignore the realities
of pathological processes. 133
In projecting the future of health care for the elderly, the standard of
negotiated consent is undoubtedly a more desirable standard to implement for
all parties involved than the traditional informed consent. Despite the assault
on its viability, the imperative of negotiated consent focuses ultimately on the
concept of "keep listening" as opposed to "keep talking."' 34 This goal, even
though often times difficult to achieve, may provide the elderly patient with
a stronger sense of participation in the direction of his or her medical treat-
ment and, hopefully, with a greater sense of trust and confidence, allow the
"ethics of intimacy rather than the ethics of strangers [to] ... take root and
flourish." '35
Seen as a normative value rather then an empirical constant,'36 perhaps,
in reality, the consequences of the doctrine of informed consent are of less
130. Id. at 68.
131. See id. A basic example of what should be recorded is as follows: "Family talked it
over and decided in favor of trying the new treatment. Patient agreed it was best." Moody,
supra note 24, at 68.
132. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OFDOCTOR AND PATIENT xi (1986).
133. SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL CHAPTER 249,
265 (1994).
134. Moody, supra note 24, at 70.
135. Id. at 69. See generally HARRY R. MOODY, ETHICS IN AN AGING SOCIETY (1992).
136. Schuck, supra note 17, at 932.
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importance than the values its seeks to promote.137 To be sure, the doctrine
needs to be contextualized both procedurally and substantively in legal
doctrine.'38 Setting new dialogic responsibilities for physicians, however, may
not succeed in strengthening the process.139 Indeed, in the present cost-
conscious health care environment, such an imposition may only serve to
further complicate its simple and direct mandate: namely, to provide a
knowledgeable atmosphere for a therapeutic partnership or moral agency
between physician and patient to occur. 4 ' In addition, without the doctrine
of informed consent, there would be little opportunity to create an atmosphere
in which-in health care delivery systems-both interdependence and inter-
relationship are acknowledged, professionally and legally, as practical norma-
tive values.' 4
Although the doctrine of informed consent will always remain a relative
term, "with the degree of completeness resting on so many variables
including, of course, the nature and reliability of the source," it should be seen
as more than an aspirational goal.142 Rather, it can and indeed should serve as
a useful construct for embedding the doctrine as an integral part of the ethos
of medicine;'43 an ethos tied to a recognition of patient trust and partnership
with the physician as the cornerstone of the healing enterprise'" which must
always seek to provide "a right and good healing action in the interests of a
particular patient."'45
In the final analysis, however, it remains for the medical profession, not
the legal profession, to formulate and effect a truly contemporary doctrine of
informed consent, one, to be sure, that is responsive to the "proddings of the
law," but, more importantly, one that is cognizant of the very complex and
nuanced interactions between patients and their physicians.'46
137. Id. at 939.
138. Id. at 951.
139. Id. at 935.
140. Pellegrino, Human Person, supra note 1; Pellegrino, Autonomy, supra note 1;
Pellegrino, Reconstruction, supra note 2, at 74.
141. GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 1, at 243.
142. Jeffrey S. Tobias, Contemporary Challenges in Clinical Research: Paying Lip
Service to Informed Consent, or a Genuine Shift of Gear?, in INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL
RESEARCH, supra note 15, at 318-19.
143. Katz, supra note 18, at 91 (arguing that until the doctrine becomes an integral aspect
of the ethos of medicine, it is condemned to remain a fairy tale).
144. See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino & John L. Harvey, Whom Should the Patient
Trust?, AM., Oct. 1, 2001, at 19.
145. Pellegrino, Reconstruction, supra note 2, at 47.
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